"Multiculturalism is in crisis...'Political correctness' is shorthand for the etiquette and working practices of the most influential ideology of our age: multiculturalism or 'identity politics'. And that ideology is falling apart" (2005). Therefore a new trend emerged in race and minority relations in secular societies. It can be traced via the responses to the respective deaths of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh as well as via the reactions to la loi sur la laïcité (or the ban on conspicuous religious symbols, such as the hijab) and the current proposals against Incitement to Religious Hatred (Part IV of the Government's Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill).

U.K. race relations

Britain's race-relations history has been eventful, to the say the least. After World War II Government agencies advertised 'British' jobs in former British colonies such as the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean (cf. Lunn, 1990) but some native Britons viewed the newcomers in the light of an ingrained racism. Racial tension escalated as the far right encouraged people to view their privileges as under threat. Nick Cohen's brief examination of the social and political milieu of the 1960's is still illuminating:

"In 1964 the Tories secured a shock victory in Birmingham Smethwick with the catchy slogan of 'If you want a nigger for a neighbour vote Labour'. In his 1968 'Rivers of Blood' speech to members of the West Midlands Conservative Political Centre, Enoch Powell attempted to turn the white working class from Labour by telling them that 'in 15 or 20 years' time the black man will have the upper hand over the white man'. It worked. Not only did he incite the mass beating of blacks and Asians, but Powell's racism helped the Tories win West Midland marginals and with them the 1970 general election" (2004).

The far right discriminated against those who didn't share similar racial characteristics to them while liberals, proud of Britain's historical tradition of tolerance, pluralism and constitutional liberalism instead pressed for migrants to commit to certain, core ideas.

From 1965 to 1968, known as the 'liberal hour' of British race relations, a 'consensus' emerged where political parties followed a similar liberal line on the issue of minorities. The liberal counter-argument to the far right was that a simple focus on assimilation and migrant numbers missed the point and a migrant's loyalty could not be reduced to passive obedience to a set of laws. Liberals argued one's citizenship in a nation-state was deeply dependent on a collective history, joint vision of what the future should be and shared values that naturally arise from living closely together i.e. a common identity and a common culture. Only then could society be cohesive, stable and unified.

Modern liberalism is inseparable from the Enlightenment that prized freedom, secularism and benefit above all. The emphasis was secular-on the public sphere and liberals favoured a melting pot (cf. Schlesinger, 1998) approach similar to the U.S. where newcomers, by definition, did not share the common identity or values of the public culture. They would then be expected to actively adopt them in the public sphere. If they did not, the newcomer would be exposed as disloyal i.e. not 'one of us'. The outcome of the liberal 'consensus' was that immigrants had to be 'integrated' into the common identity and culture (a mutual collective history, joint vision of the future and shared value-system) to prevent them segregating to live parallel lives in parallel societies.

Liberals accepted racism had to be fought to help ease the transition of immigrants willing to adapt into citizens and they saw fighting racism as their part of the bargain. Integration was therefore always discussed as a two-way (carrot and stick) process and could therefore effortlessly be distinguished from assimilation, which was very much one-sided (just stick).

With an atomistic view of society that exalted the status of the individual human being over the social whole the search for individual happiness was also a cornerstone of liberalism. Jeremy Bentham elucidated this in his theory of Utilitarianism when he wrote "...the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of right and wrong" (1994, reprint, p3). Thus the way liberals viewed the immigration and race-relations dilemma of the 1950's and 60's was also from the angle of utility and enlightened self-interest. With minorities potentially threatening to erode national identity and societal harmony liberals viewed the greatest happiness of the greatest number as their will against the minority.

This leads us to a disturbing conundrum. If, on the one hand, minorities integrated and accepted the norms and values of the majority they would no longer be viewed as a minority by a liberal society. They would instead become of the majority and their happiness would automatically be part of the greatest happiness of the number. If, on the other hand, sections of society did not integrate then they would permanently be viewed as a 'minority', the 'other' (cf. Habermas, 2000), needing help and assistance, i.e. integration, to progress. They would surely then clash with the common public civic identity and 'universal' liberal values they had failed to adopt.

So what guarantee of rights can a liberal society possibly offer minorities when it prizes freedom, secularism and benefit and seeks to uphold a common public identity and culture against foreign incursion from those who are 'other' (which minorities inherently were)? The answer most minorities supposed was exceedingly little.

Minorities often expressed disappointment at liberal integration policies. Most first-generation immigrants were already remarkably loyal to Britain and its values and were determined to fit in. They viewed racism as the obstacle and saw the Government's persistence in simply demanding their devotion as belittling. The second generation of immigrants remained largely suspicious of integrationists feeling palpably threatened by the existence of a dominant liberal cultural framework that they had to accept as superior. Soon minorities in the U.K. had generally begun to retreat from integration. The 1970's witnessed the growth of various rights movements including feminists, Black Panthers, Native Americans etc. so when calls for 'equality' and 'recognition' throughout the Western world grew louder an alternative to the liberal model was sought. Multiculturalism evolved in reaction to this state of affairs.
Multiculturalism is moral relativism
In 1971, Canada was the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy and other Western nations soon followed suit till the liberal integrationist ideas of the 1960's on race-relations were uprooted and multiculturalism became an organising principle of society (cf. Ravitch, 1990).

A few have attempted to define multiculturalism (also known as 'cultural pluralism') in a one-dimensional manner relying on the word itself to guide them hence they believe multiculturalism simply means many cultures. This confuses multiculturalism with the pluralistic view of liberal race-relations. Failure to differentiate between the diversity that liberalism endorsed and the anti-integration logic of multiculturalism is patently naïve. Liberals believed they were correct and depended on a common culture to integrate newcomers. Multiculturalists denied anyone could ever be correct and denied a common culture existed. Multiculturalism was therefore completely distinct from the liberal view and clashed with it on various levels.

The definition of multiculturalism was always in conflict as it was an 'essentially contested' concept. However it could be summed up as the recognition of all groups by society and the denial of any form of common culture in order to equalise relations between minorities and the dominant majority in the conviction that no way of life was correct and all were deserving of equal respect. Bhikhu Parekh confirmed this when he wrote: "Multiculturalism basically means that no culture is perfect or represents the best life and that it can therefore benefit from a critical dialogue with other cultures" ('So what exactly is multiculturalism?' 2005).

Detractors contended the 'cultural difference' approach led to a lack of moral certainty by firmly pointing the way to moral relativism. Moral relativism was a point of contention between multiculturalists and liberals. If what is morally right or wrong is purely relative depending on one's view then there can be no certainty in anything not even with the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Liberals accused multiculturalists of evading moral judgements and questions by not answering at all.

Multiculturalism made the assertion that minority cultures or ways of life were not sufficiently protected by simply ensuring the individual rights of their members. As a consequence minorities should also be protected with special group rights or privileges (Kimlicka, 1996). This involved not criticising or offending any way of life or minority group, a direct contradiction of the liberal view enamoured of human rights due to its focus on the individual. Thus multiculturalism was the reverse of the liberal trend as it made the indigenous community retreat (i.e. through political correctness) rather than the newcomer yield (e.g. through citizenship tests and integration).

Multiculturalism offered socially excluded minorities more than just liberalism's tolerance and requirements to integrate within a greater dominant cultural framework. Instead multiculturalists denied a common identity or overarching culture ever existed or could ever exist. By denying these altogether, the theory of multiculturalism offered all minorities total 'recognition' by proclaiming that all cultures were equal (or at least equally wrong) no matter how absurd or disruptive others thought they were.

The struggle for recognition

Multiculturalists sought to reverse the universalising trend of the Enlightenment, to celebrate every single culture (rather than just one as the liberals did). So it was inescapable that every step they took to wrap 'minority' cultures in cotton wool and push them into the foreground served to push the 'dominant' identity and culture, variously perceived as Caucasian, Western, liberal, male, middle-class and heterosexual, into the background.

According to Charles Taylor, this was due to the struggle for 'recognition' at the very heart of the multicultural project (1994). This struggle harked back to Hegel's dialectic of the Master/Slave relationship. This dialectic begins with two independent beings that launch a quest for recognition from each other and engage in a fight to the death. This recognition is necessary because Hegel believed '...self-consciousness is only by being acknowledged or recognised (J.B. Baillie translation, 1949)'. The two sides attempt to cancel out the other in order to become certain of their own true selves till one is defeated. As the victor cannot receive the desired recognition from the vanquished if he does not exist, the dialectic continues when the victor, chooses to enslave the vanquished rather than slay him hence the Master/Slave relationship. Multiculturalists like Taylor felt minorities took the position of the Slave in this scenario and felt they had to engage in a post-Hegelian struggle for recognition with the Master (the dominant segment of society):

"The age of dignity is born. This new critique of pride, leading not to solitary mortification but to a politics of equal dignity, is what Hegel took up and made famous in his dialectic of the master and the slave. Against the old discourse on the evil of pride, he takes it as fundamental that we can nourish only to the extent that we are recognized. Each consciousness seeks recognition in another, and this is not a sign of a lack of virtue. But the ordinary conception of honor as hierarchical is crucially flawed. It is flawed because it cannot answer the need that sends people after recognition in the first place. Those who fail to win out in the honor stakes remain unrecognized. But even those who do win are more subtly frustrated, because they win recognition from the losers, whose acknowledgment is, by hypothesis, not really valuable, since they are no longer free, self-supporting subjects on the same level with the winners. The struggle for recognition can find only one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals (Taylor, 1992, p.88)".

The multiculturalists were so focused on equal respect for all they felt they had to drive back the dominant culture. This was because they felt the public domain of any society could never be completely neutral, as the principal, leading faction would already have set the current cultural parameters (i.e. the liberals had already filled this sphere with their republican values).

When minorities claimed equal respect they were demanding to be part of the re-structuring of that public sphere on their own terms. It was undeniably true (to multiculturalists at least) that marginalised sectors of society would always ask why the dominant group had their worldview universalised while its own was parochialised and privatised. They felt aggrieved at the liberal attempt to combine a mono-cultural public realm with a multicultural private realm as the public recognition and institutionalisation of one culture could cause other cultures to be viewed as subsidiary, unimportant, even abnormal. They worked to alter this situation and this led to political correctness, an immediate by-product of multiculturalism. The sentiment of not offending any minority group left traditionally dominant sections of society reeling. Some asked where political correctness would stop. Recent history proves almost any group that viewed itself as an excluded minority could attempt to gain ground through multiculturalism. The U.S. provides many examples. The phrase 'handicapped' (cap, hat or begging bowl in hand) had to be shelved in favour of 'disabled'. The reform of education agenda to conform to the 'multi-cultists' led to a public outcry. Short people were soon referred to as vertically-challenged, the bald were follicly-challenged and it has been de rigeur for sometime to wish others Happy Holidays rather than Happy Christmas (or even Happy Xmas).

Multiculturalism rapidly overwhelmed the liberal agenda to take its place as the Master in the Hegalian Master/Slave dialectic and its dominance over academics, public policy practitioners and politicians was often extraordinary. Worldwide, multiculturalism probably reached its zenith with the formation in 1994 of Nelson Mandela's South African 'Rainbow Government' and domestically in 2000 with the publication of the Runnymede Trust report, 'The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain', chaired by Bhikhu Parekh that called for a community of communities and a revision of Britain's 'national story' to a more inclusive version (cf. 'The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain', 2000).

Post 9/11 paradigm shift

When Muslims with British passports were found to be fighting with the Afghan Taliban against British forces a discussion began on the loyalty of Muslims who were also British citizens and who were now seen as a people apart with a disparate vision of how society should look. Were Muslims a fifth column? Was their primary loyalty to the ummah (the worldwide community of Muslims) as opposed to any nation-state? Could the shari’ah (Islamic law) and human rights be reconciled? Finsbury Park Mosque in North London was particularly prominent in the debate and estimates of large numbers of radical, subversive jihadists led to cosmopolitan London being nicknamed ‘Londonistan’ by the C.I.A. (or l’antechambre de l’Afghanistan by the DGSE - French Secret Service) (Ulph, 2004).
This was analogous to the criticism of Commonwealth immigrants of the 1950’s when they were rejected and constructed as the ‘other’ with the far right on the march. Soon the discussion reverted to one last seen when Lord Norman Tebbit remarked in 1991:
“Great waves of immigration by people who do not share our culture, our language, our ways of social conduct, in many cases who owe no allegiance to our country, was and is a destabilizing factor in society (Mueen, 2003)”.

The core debate was on how to cope with a segment of the population that was becoming more detached and isolated. Phrases like segregation, secular melting pot and integration crept back into vogue. Most significant was the term ‘social cohesion’ which encapsulated the liberal vision of society unified by individuals with a common identity and shared values in public.

The rhetoric was eerily similar to the ‘liberal hour’ discussion of 1965-68. Once again, but this time in the twenty-first century, the insidious influence of outsiders who didn’t ‘belong’ had to be corrected through integration policies but this time there were significant differences.

This New Liberalism in minority-relations differed from the 1960’s liberalism as race was no longer the popular issue. Security concerns in the charged post 9/11 atmosphere dictated that loyalty to the nation’s values was of paramount importance. The question for liberals was whether Muslims even wanted to be part of British life. Liberals began to debate the impact of Islam on Western society, often unfavourably, and as the considerations of social cohesion changed a New Liberalism began to emerge.

New Liberal values

The defence of certain values is central to the New Liberal thesis, as integration cannot take place unless the common public identity and culture can be defined for the newcomer to accept. The debate on these values is not isolated to Britain as the entire continent is grappling with similar questions on values and identity (Toggenburg, 2004), the various public comments by followers of New Liberal trend substantiates this. Václav Havel and others set out these ideas on values comprehensively in the ‘Charter of European Identity’ of 1994 that set out a secular worldview lifted direct from the Enlightenment:
“Europe is above all a community of values...They are rooted in common legal principles acknowledging the freedom of the individual and social responsibility. Fundamental European values are based on tolerance, humanity, fraternity. Building on its historical roots in classical antiquity and Christianity, Europe further developed these values during the course of the Renaissance, the Humanist movement, and the Enlightenment, which led in turn to the development of democracy, the recognition of fundamental and human rights and the rule of law” (Zemni & Parker, 2002).
Whenever the discussion on European values begins anew it is clear not much, if anything, has changed since then, or even from the Enlightenment. Liberals still claim that their values are universal and should dominate in order for progress to ensue. Jack Straw stated this explicitly in March 2004 when he spoke on Middle Eastern reform:

“Promoting the values we believe in-good governance, human rights, tolerance and the rule of law-is not an attempt to impose ‘Western’ or ‘Christian’ values on Arab countries at the expense of their traditional culture. The values set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are just that-universal, and drawn from the traditions and values of countries around the world. They are values for which people around the world strive; and which are compatible with every single faith in the world. We want to see them fully realised everywhere” (2004). New Liberals have no hesitation or compunction in declaring the universality of their values. Therefore, it is of no surprise that the outcome of the New Liberal ‘consensus’ throughout Europe is that immigrants have to be ‘integrated’ into a common identity and culture (a mutual collective history, joint vision of the future and shared value-system) that stems from liberal thinking to prevent them segregating to live parallel lives in parallel societies.

The multicultural ‘settlement’ was still largely in evidence up to 9/11 (Kundnani, 2002). This point should have meant that like all other minority groups Islam should have benefited from the same advantages others had gained through multiculturalism i.e. unswerving amnesty from criticism, the right to be treated like all other ways of life simply by existing plus the opportunity to remould its place in the public sphere on its own terms.

It was inconceivable, post-’settlement’, that a minority group with its own way of life could come under sustained fire so Islam should have found the same ‘recognition’ and comprehensive acceptance that other minorities had found. Many expected that protection. Instead, in a reversal of the original Master/Slave dialectic, the first genuine strains on multiculturalism began in the aftermath of 9/11 as a resurgent New Liberalism, determined to ‘deal’ with the wayward allegiance of Muslims by imposing its values through integration, clashed with the dominant theory.

Multiculturalism in crisis

Theodore Dalrymple's comments in October 2001 were typical of the post-9/11 mood (note a play on the U.S. Declaration of Independence of 1776-a liberal charter if one ever existed-in addition to a nod to the Bible):
"Multiculturalists hold these truths to be self-evident: that all cultures are created equal and are endowed by their creators with equal and compatible virtues. Thus there can be no fundamental conflict between cultures. The lion can lie down with the lamb, not at some unspecified time in the future, but here and now, in the gardens of the West" (2001). He described this attitude as mental flabbiness adding: "The shallowness of this view should require no exposition" (ibid). iberals began to mount a determined offensive against multicultural theory in the media. The two policies were mutually exclusive so one had to go and the pressure became so acute that on November 1, 2001, The Guardian's Editorial proclaimed 'Multicultural values must be defended' ('Britain's loyalty test', The Guardian (Leader), 1 November, 2001).

New Labour Government embraces New Liberal policy

Most attributed the shift from multicultural to New Liberal race-relations to David Blunkett after his comments in the wake of 9/11. In a now infamous interview with 'The Independent on Sunday' in December 2001 he commented on serious race riots in cities such as Oldham, Burnley and Bradford involving Muslim youth that summer (Bagguley & Hussain, 2003). Blunkett, then Home Secretary, became the first leading Labour politician in over 30 years to explicitly reconnect the two issues of race-relations and immigration while undermining multicultural policy.

With U.K. race-relations in the midst of an unquestioned crisis, he announced the Government was considering liberal proposals such as citizenship studies in schools and English language tests, citizenship ceremonies and oaths of allegiance for immigrants. While doing so he blamed the continuation of practises such as female genital mutilation and forced marriages on 'cultural difference' and 'moral relativism'. In a throwback to liberal hour discourse, he also stated this situation must be changed with an adoption of an overarching framework of 'British' values stating:

"We have norms of acceptability and those who come into our home - for that is what it is - should accept those norms just as we would have to do if we went elsewhere"(Brown, 2001).

Despite Blunkett's best efforts and even Rod Liddle's claim that Islam killed multiculturalism (2004), two other leading public figures were principally responsible for dealing the (figurative) deathblow; Trevor Phillips, Chair of the 'Commission for Racial Equality' and David Goodhart, Editor of 'Prospect' magazine. Goodhart explained:

"In any case, the laissez faire approach of the post-war period in which ethnic minority citizens were not encouraged to join the common culture (although many did) should be buried. Citizenship ceremonies, language lessons and the mentoring of new citizens should help to create a British version of the old U.S. melting pot. This third way on identity can be distinguished from the coercive assimilationism of the nationalist right, which rejects any element of foreign culture, and from multiculturalism, which rejects a common culture" (Goodhart, 2004).

Trevor Phillips sparked a storm of controversy in a series of speeches, articles and interviews where he suggested that the mere celebration of diversity did nothing to address inequality. In fact he went further to say 'multiculturalism', and 80's style 'multiculturalist' policies, were divisive and led to separatism in society. He spoke about integration at the 'Multicultural Futures Conference' in Tuscany, Italy in September 2004 saying:

"We need to achieve an integrated society based on 'shared values' and 'shared loyalties' which allows for diversity and difference... People need to be encouraged to feel British and to be properly welcomed as British. I believe that all our citizens should be encouraged to take 'citizen' classes and 'win' their passport at 18 years old whether they are born in the U.K. or not" ('Deal with difference through integration, says Trevor Phillips', 2004). The collapse was extraordinary as multiculturalism's long tenure as the bedrock of U.K. race-relations strategy was openly terminated in near indecent haste as the Government vocally turned the clock back to liberal policy and on April 10, 2004 Howard Jacobson declared the end of multiculturalism as we knew it (2004).

The events of 9/11 had a profound effect across Europe too and policy makers were soon pushing the New Liberalism across the continent. The liberal advance was particularly prominent in the Netherlands, long considered the most tolerant of European nations. With the Muslim minority populations, mostly Moroccan and Turkish men, of Rotterdam, Amsterdam and the Hague rising to the point where it is predicted they will soon become absolute majorities, anti-Islamic feeling is now a matter of grave concern (Moynahan, 2005). Sensing a clash between secular, liberal values and the unreformed values of the Muslim minority the Dutch reassessed their laissez-faire, multicultural immigration policy. New arrivals, including Imams, must now learn how to speak Dutch and take classes on the values of Dutch society. In February 2005, The Sunday Times reported the results of Dutch poll where 80% were in favour of stronger measures to get immigrants to integrate and 40% hoped Muslims would "no longer feel at home here" (ibid).

The 'International Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (IHF)' undertook a study on eleven E.U. member states called 'Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the E.U.- Developments since 9/11'. The report, released in March 2005, asked whether 'Muslims were the enemy within'. Amongst the findings of violence and abuse of Muslims associated with fears of terrorism was the astonishing statistic that 80% of Germans surveyed in 2004 associated the word 'Islam' with 'terrorism' and the 'oppression of women'. Most significant, however, was the report's identification of the trend towards New Liberal thinking:

"The November 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands gave rise to renewed discussions about the merits of the idea of a multicultural society in several countries. A leading theme of these discussions was the importance of ensuring that immigrants, in particular those of Muslim faith, integrate in accordance with the norms and values of the E.U. countries. For example in Germany, some politicians and media warned of the danger of 'Muslim parallel societies' and the major opposition party re-introduced the concept of a 'lead culture,' to which immigrants should be expected to conform" (Nyman, 2005).

U.K. government policy has not shifted from its newly found New Liberal direction and in fact still emphasises integration and shared values. In December 2004, the Home Office published a handbook by the Home Office entitled "Life in the United Kingdom, A Journey to Citizenship". It claimed to provide "a better knowledge of our way of life" to people seeking to get British Citizenship and integrate into Britain. The consultation document, 'Integration Matters' released in its final form on 9 March, 2005, went as far as defining integration while confirming the approach was on individuals (liberal) rather than on groups (multicultural):
"This strategy does not assume that refugees are a homogenous group. Refugees are, above all, individuals, with complex and diverse backgrounds, skills and qualities" (Integration Matters, 2005). The reality of this change from group rights to individual rights is plain; the focus on the individual is at the heart of many Government policies since 9/11. The provision against Incitement to Religious Hatred (Part IV of the Government's Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill) is one such policy as individuals are protected but the belief or minority identity is not (cf. Incitement to Religious Hatred-Frequently Asked Questions', Home Office).

This was made even clearer when in 2004 the British Government faced the embarrassment of a leak in the Sunday Times of their secret plans to integrate Muslims in Britain. 'Operation Contest' was a blueprint to improve relations with the Muslim community in order to win 'the hearts and minds' of young Muslims and integrate them before they became isolated and vulnerable to enticement by terrorist recruiters. The aims of 'Contest' were categorically integrationist and in classic liberal integrationist tradition the report discussed two-way measures including Shari'ah compliant mortgages and, in line with New Liberal thinking, contained resolutions to assist Muslims to achieve their side of the bargain including entering the political process (Winnett & Leppard, 2004).

Labour's implementation of such secular individualistic policies to do with the 'management' of minority issues and social cohesion through integration appears to mean the New Liberalism in minority relations is here to stay.

Conclusion

This paper is not a tribute to multiculturalism. In a debate centred on how societies can best retain a sense of cohesiveness the overt celebration of 'identity difference' that multiculturalism embodied could only cement segregation. Furthermore, the moral relativism and the acknowledgment of ethnic minorities as such could only complicate matters. That is not to say we should favour the New Liberal trend either. Liberals are tied to the model of the nation-state where some degree of cultural unification within the prescribed territorial limits is expected of newcomers. The desire to fuse the nation placed undue emphasis on, or even an imposition of, a liberal conception of identity built upon certain specific values. It is inevitable that newcomers, morally upstanding and eager to contribute to society would feel socially excluded if they did not embrace the values of the Enlightenment.

The end of multiculturalism at the hands of New Liberals allows us to track certain changes in society. Today racism and prejudice are predicated on the fear of what a liberal majority defines as 'other'. While discussions persist for and against Islamophobia it is beyond doubt that the fear of the unknown, the 'other' drives prejudice. So newcomers are told they need to make themselves less strange to others by becoming more 'British', embracing liberal values and integrating.

It is clear that the New Liberal agenda is not particularly open-minded to what is essentially different to it and to whom it defines as a minority. Madeleine Bunting articulated this predicament a month after the events of 9/11 speaking of a liberalism that was intolerant, adding: "...here is the outline of a form of western fundamentalism. It believes in historical progress and regards the west as its most advanced manifestation. And it insists that the only way for other countries to match its achievement is to adopt its political, economic and cultural values. It is tolerant towards other cultures only to the extent that they reflect its own values - so it is frequently fiercely intolerant of religious belief and has no qualms about expressing its contempt and prejudice. At its worst, western fundamentalism echoes the characteristics it finds so repulsive in its enemy, Bin Laden: first, a sense of unquestioned superiority; second, an assertion of the universal applicability of its values; and third, a lack of will to understand what is profoundly different from itself " (2001).

How can any group of people, small or large, feel secure when liberalism defines them as a minority? Social cohesion has become the official minority and race-relations policy of this country so minorities are now under pressure to conform to the New Liberal vision of a common public identity and culture. If they do not they will be viewed not just as a minority but as the 'other', a band of outsiders, alien, disloyal, a problem to be managed and integrated. Liberalism will always be so (Bunting, 2003)

The Muslim community in particular has had its loyalty questioned far too often for it not to notice there's a problem (Cordon, 2003) and although social cohesion is the stated aim of the Labour Government we must ask what cohesion can be managed while the 'war on terror' casts an entire group of citizens as the 'enemy within'. The appalling experience of the Muslim minority throughout Europe post-9/11 is testament to the effects of being viewed as the 'other' in liberal societies. Discussions on the suspension of habeas corpus, the legitimisation of stress techniques in interrogation (i.e. torture) and admissions of extraordinary rendition have raised a great deal of alarm. The anti-Terror Control Orders (part of the Prevention of Terrorism Act) are another frightening illustration of New Liberalism's capacity to turn in on itself to achieve its end of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

We must also ask if it was really a revelation to witness the U.K. General Election campaign of 2005 so focused on the immigration and race-relations issue? Moreover, is this a satisfactory state of affairs for minorities in the secular West?

The New Liberals would say yes but can it be acceptable that an entire culture, indeed civilisation, can impose its history, vision and values as well as societal laws? After all the liberals could never tolerate multiculturalists doing the same through expectations to conform to political correctness.

While constitutional liberalism expects citizens to comply with legislation applied publicly the synchronisation of society cannot take place effectively if people are singled-out as 'other'; left to be assimilated or integrated due to the incongruence in their values with a 'common culture'.

By Hassan Choudhury
Source: New Civilisation Magazine

Throughout this paper, the expression "9/11" is used to denote the catastrophic events that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001.

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